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Fear and Loathing on the California Coastline:
Are Coastal Commission Property
Exactions Constitutional?
I. INTRODUCTION
Many California shoreline residents have heard horror stories
about the California Coastal Commission. One such horror story was
realized by a certain Malibu Beach entrepreneur. This individual,
seeking to acquire a permit to construct a wall which would alter the
interior floor plan of his fire-gutted restaurant, was given permission
to perform the construction-conditioned, however, on his granting
an easement to the State of California for lateral public access1 across
his private beach. Dismayed, and unwilling to expend the time,
money, and energy to battle the Commission, 2 the entrepreneur
opted to sell the property rather than be forced to give up his private
beach.
This scenario is not the only one of its kind. In 1985 alone, the Cal-
ifornia Coastal Commission secured 112 such uncompensated beach
access exactions3 through dedication or deed restriction imposed
upon landowners seeking to build on their property. 4 Since 1972, the
1. Lateral access is access along the shoreline. Vertical access is access to the
shoreline. This comment focuses on the constitutionality of the exaction of easements
which provide lateral access along the coastline.
2. Normally, reconstruction of a fire damaged structure is exempted from the
permit requirement. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30610(g) (West 1986). In spite of this
clear statutory mandate, the Commission refused to exercise its discretion to grant the
exemption in this case. Since the Coastal Commission is an administrative body of the
state government, the "disappointed complainant" is faced with the additional burden
of first "exhaust[ing] his administrative remedies" before judicial review may be ob-
tained. 7 P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 52.03(1), at 52-16 (1986). The
disappointed complainant described in this article is a personal acquaintance of the
author.
3. An "exaction" is a condition imposed by the government upon one seeking to
develop real property. Exactions for such improvements and facilities as streets, side-
walks, sewers, and parks are common. See Jacobsen & McHenry, Exactions on Devel-
opment Permission, in WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE CAPTURE AND
COMPENSATION 342 (D. Hagman & D. Misczynski eds. 1978).
4. CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMM'N, COASTAL ACCESS PROGRAM SixTH ANNUAL RE-
PORT 4 (1986) (available by writing the California Coastal Commission, 631 Howard St.,
4th Floor, San Francisco, CA 94105; additional information is available from the Assis-
tant Deputy Director for Access and Coastal Resource Information Programs, at (415)
543-8555).
Commission has reportedly imposed more than 1800 of these dedica-
tion requirements upon California landowners.5
II. THE CALIFORNIA COASTAL ACT-PARENT OF
THE COASTAL COMMISSION
The California Coastal Act of 19766 is the legislatively enacted suc-
cessor to the California Coastal Zone Act,7 which was promulgated
by referendum in 1972. The Coastal Act granted to the Commission
broad powers to police the "coastal zone"8 established by the Act. It
was intended to "[p]rotect, maintain, . . . enhance and restore the
overall quality of the coastal zone environment and . . .resources
.... [to] [a]ssure orderly, balanced utilization of... [those] resources
[and to] [m]aximize public access .. .[a]nd recreational opportunities
.... 9 In order to carry out these purposes, regional or local commis-
sions, along with a central "Coastal Commission," were established
and authorized to oversee the enforcement of the Act's provisions.10
Among the powers conferred on the Commission and its counter-
parts is that of granting or denying "coastal development permits"
for "new development projects" within the coastal zone.*" In addi-
tion, the Commission may subject issuance of these permits "to rea-
sonable terms and conditions" to ensure that the new development
conforms to the policies and goals of the Coastal Act.12 Terms and
conditions commonly attached to permit approval by the Commission
include requirements that the landowner dedicate a portion of his
5. CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMM'N, COASTAL ACCESS PROGRAM FIFTH ANNUAL RE-
PORT 8 (1985).
6. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30000-30950 (West 1986 & Supp. 1987).
7. Former CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 27000-27650 (repealed in 1977).
8. The coastal zone includes all the "land and water area of the State of Califor-
nia from the Oregon border to the border of the Republic of Mexico... and extending
inland generally 1,000 yards from the mean high tide line of the sea." CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE § 30103(a) (West 1986 & Supp. 1987).
9. Id. § 30001.5.
10. See generally id. §§ 30300-30305.
11. Id. § 30600. "New development projects" include any development not men-
tioned in section 30212(b). Excluded from the Commission's purview by section 30212
are acts involving: (1) replacement of any structure, other than a public works facility,
which does not exceed by more than 10 percent the floor area, height, or bulk of the
destroyed structure and sited in the same location as the destroyed structure; (2) dem-
olition or reconstruction of a single-family residence which does not increase by more
than 10 percent the floor area, height or bulk of the former structure and which is
located in the same location as the former structure; (3) remodeling or improvement of
a structure which does not block or impede public access, change the intensity of its
use, or increase by more than 10 percent the floor area, height and bulk of the struc-
ture; (4) reconstruction or repair of any seawall not seaward of the pre-existing one;
and (5) any repair and maintenance activity which requires a coastal development per-
mit pursuant to section 30610, unless the Commissions find that such activity will have
an adverse impact on lateral public access along the beach. Id. § 30212.
12. Id. § 30607.
[Vol. 14: 357, 1987] Coastal Commission Property Exactions
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
property to the State of California for public access across the land-
owner's privately owned uplands.13 Often, scenic easement condi-
tions are also imposed.14
Although the Commission has been challenged on various
grounds,15 its scope of authority has been challenged perhaps most
often on the basis of its power to subject permit authorizations to
public access and aesthetically based conditions. This comment will
discuss the extent of the California Coastal Commission's authority
under the United States Constitution to impose public access and aes-
thetic conditions upon the granting of permits for new development
within the coastal zone. In particular, the imposition of these condi-
tions upon individual landowners, as opposed to commercial subdi-
viders, will be the focus of this inquiry.
The validity of the Commission's exactions will be analyzed in two
steps, in accordance with the approach adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in a recent decision, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhat-
tan CATV Corp.:16 first, whether these exactions are valid under the
police power of the State of California;17 and second, whether such
exactions constitute a taking of private property for public use under
the doctrine of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York,i 8 for
which the Constitution requires that the government pay just
compensation.19
It will be concluded that California Coastal Commission public ac-
cess exactions, while valid under the police power in some circum-
stances, are invalid in cases where exactions are required of
13. See, e.g., Liberty v. California Coastal Comm'n, 113 Cal. App. 3d 491, 170 Cal.
Rptr. 247 (1980). In California, the mean high tide line separates the tidelands from
the uplands. See 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 36.3(c) (R. Clark ed. 1967). Tidelands
are lands lying between the mean high and mean low tide lines, while uplands in-
cludes the areas lying landward. Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 790 (1971).
14. See, e.g., Sea Ranch Ass'n v. California Coastal Comm'n, 527 F. Supp. 390 (N.D.
Cal.), vacated, 454 U.S. 1071 (1981).
15. See CEEED v. California Coastal Zone Comm'n, 43 Cal. App. 3d 306, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 315 (1974). In CEEED, the Coastal Commission's predecessor, the "Coastal Zone
Commission," was challenged for: (1) infringement of the fundamental right to travel;
(2) denial of due process of laws; (3) exercise of unlawfully designated legislative
power; and (4) invalid state intrusion into municipal affairs of chartered cities. The
California Court of Appeals upheld the Commission's authority on every charge. Id. at
333, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
16. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
17. See infra notes 20-78 and accompanying text.
18. 438 U.S. 104 (1977), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978).
19. See infra notes 79-135 and accompanying text.
landowners who do not intend to subdivide their land. Applying the
Penn Central test of constitutionality, the Commission's beach ease-
ment exactions will be shown as unconstitutional in all applications,
since a taking is present and the aggrieved landowners do not receive
just compensation. Finally, it will be suggested that the economic
burden of providing public access to California's coastal zone should
rightfully be placed upon the general taxpaying public, rather than
on individual beach-front property owners.
III. VALIDITY OF EXACTIONS UNDER THE POLICE POWER
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
States and municipalities have constitutional authority under the
police power to enact laws regulating land use so long as such enact-
ments serve to advance the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare.2 0 In addition, the state regulation must be reasonable and
not arbitrary.2 1 The eminent domain power of a state is distinguish-
able from its general police power, since eminent domain involves a
taking of property for which just compensation must be paid.22
Although the police power inheres in the state, it may be delegated
by legislative action to subordinate governmental bodies.23 In this
manner, the California legislature has delegated its police power to
the California Coastal Commission with regard to planning and man-
agement in the coastal zone.24
A. Validity of Imposition of Aesthetic Conditions
Under the Police Power
The authority of the California Coastal Commission to condition
the granting of new development permits on aesthetic considera-
tions25 has been challenged on the basis that the conditioning of such
permits solely upon aesthetic considerations constitutes an arbitrary
20. See 5 P. ROHAN, supra note 2, § 35.06(1), at 35-40.
21. "[T]he police power is the power of the sovereign to legislate in behalf of the
public health, morals or safety by general regulations reasonably adapted to the end in
view and not creating any arbitrary discrimination between different classes of men or
things." 1 NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.42, at 1-134 (J. Sackman ed.
1984).
22. See D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW
§ 173 (1971).
23. See id
24. Section 30330 of the Public Resources Code provides that "[tihe commission
... shall have the primary responsibility for the implementation of the provisions of
[the Coastal Act] and is designated as the state coastal zone planning and management
agency for any and all purposes .... " CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30330 (West 1986).
25. Section 30214(a)(4) of the Public Resources Code states that the Coastal Act
was intended to accomplish the "protection of aesthetic values" of the coastal zone. Id
§ 30214(a)(4). Section 30215 mandates the protection of "scenic and visual qualities of
coastal areas .... Id. § 30215.
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and unreasonable exercise of the police power.26 Like other land use
regulations, to constitute a valid exercise of the police power, aes-
thetic conditions imposed upon new development projects must ad-
vance the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare and must
not be arbitrary. 27 Prior to 1925, the "general welfare" aspect of the
police power had not been widely recognized. 28 Cases decided in the
early part of this century involving land use regulations show judicial
hostility toward aesthetic considerations where they constituted the
sole basis for an exercise of the police power by a state.29
The 1926 United States Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Am-
bler Realty Co.30 approved "general welfare" as a viable factor to be
considered in determining the validity of state exercises of the police
power.3 1 Euclid is thus said to have provided the basis upon which
aesthetic considerations have since been grounded.3 2
Despite the foothold provided by Euclid, the legitimacy of aesthetic
considerations relating to land use was an open issue for the next
several years.33 Most courts continued to insist that aesthetic con-
cerns could not provide the sole basis for aesthetically based land use
regulations.3 4
Further legitimization of aesthetic concerns as a basis for state land
use regulation resulted from the 1954 Supreme Court decision in
26. See, e.g., Bel Mar Estates v. California Coastal Comm'n, 115 Cal. App. 3d 936,
171 Cal. Rptr. 773 (1981) (landowner's proposed development permit was denied in or-
der to preserve the aesthetic characteristics of a scenic canyon and the surrounding
natural vegetation).
27. See 3 P. ROHAN, supra note 2, § 16.01, at 16-2 to 16-3.
28. See, e.g., Comment, The Aesthetic Factor in Zoning, 11 DuQ. L. REV. 204, 209
(1972).
29. See, e.g., City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Advertising & Sign Painting
Co., 72 N.J.L. 285, 287, 62 A. 267, 268 (1905):
No case has been cited, nor are we aware of any case which holds that a man
may be deprived of his property because his tastes are not those of his neigh-
bors. Aesthetic considerations are a matter of luxury and indulgence rather
than of necessity, and it is necessity alone which justifies the exercise of the
police power to take private property without compensation.
30. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
31. "To the phrase, 'public health, safety, and morals,' was added 'general welfare,'
even though this term had been sporadically implemented by the courts prior to the
Euclid decision." Comment, supra note 28, at 209.
32. "The concept of the general welfare has been enlarged gradually to include
many new considerations. Such terms as public convenience, comfort, and prosperity
become linked with the general welfare." Agnor, Beauty Begins a Comeback- Aesthetic
Considerations in Zoning, 11 J. PUB. L. 260, 264 (1962) (emphasis in original). From
this point, it was only a short step toward finding support for aesthetic considerations.
33. See 3 P. ROHAN, supra note 2, § 16.01, at 16-20.
34. See id. at 16-21.
Berman v. Parker.35 Although Berman involved eminent domain,
and not police power, it has been widely cited in cases which address
the issue of state police power and aesthetics.36 The language used
by the Court was broad and inclusive:
The values it [the redevelopment plan involved in the case] represents are
spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the
power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful
as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully
patrolled.
3 7
Despite the Court's apparent approval of the involvement of aes-
thetic considerations in property regulation in Berman, change in the
judicial outlook among the states has been slow. Throughout the
1970's, most jurisdictions remained insistent that, in order to fall
within the scope of the police power, land use regulations be based
primarily on some other well-recognized grounds, such as economic
considerations.3 8
By 1980, however, the tide had turned. It can now be said that a
majority of jurisdictions have adopted the position that aesthetic fac-
tors alone may support a state's exercise of the police power.3 9 Ac-
cording to Professor Rohan, only eleven jurisdictions now expressly
disapprove of regulations which are based solely upon aesthetic
factors. 4
0
The United States Supreme Court lent approval to aesthetic con-
siderations in land use regulations in the 1980 decision of Met-
romedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego.41 A law banning certain
billboards, partly on the basis of aesthetics, was being challenged as
violative of the first amendment. Addressing the "city's interest in
35. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
36. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 610 P.2d 407, 164
Cal. Rptr. 510 (1980), rev'd, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (on first amendment grounds). The Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court referred to Berman as follows:
Most jurisdictions now concur with the broad declaration of Justice Douglas
in Berman v. Parker .... Although Justice Douglas tendered this description
in a case upholding the exercise of the power of eminent domain for commu-
nity redevelopment, it has since been recognized as a correct description of
the authority of a state or city to enact legislation under the police power.
Id. at 861, 610 P.2d at 413, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 516 (citations omitted).
37. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33.
38. See generally Note, Zoning-General Welfare Includes Consideration of Aes-
thetic and Property Values, 78 DIcK. L. REV. 605 (1974).
39. See 3 P. ROHAN, supra note 2, § 16.01, at 16-25. See also Bufford, Beyond the
Eye of the Beholder: A New Majority of Jurisdictions Authorize Aesthetic Regulation,
48 UMKC L. REV. 125 (1980). But see Rowlett, Aesthetic Regulation Under the Police
Power: The New General Welfare and the Presumption of Constitutionality, 34 VAND.
L. REV. 603, 605 n.16 (1981) ("Because of the difficulties of interpreting some of the
aesthetic regulation cases, some room exists for disagreement concerning whether cer-
tain jurisdictions follow the majority or minority rule.").
40. 3 P. ROHAN, supra note 2, § 16.01, at 16-25 to 16-26 n.56.
41. 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality opinion), rev'g 26 Cal. 3d 848, 610 P.2d 407, 164
Cal. Rptr. 510 (1980).
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traffic safety and aesthetics," Justice White, speaking for the plural-
ity, stated, "[W]e cannot conclude that the city has drawn an ordi-
nance [which] fails directly to advance substantial government
interests."42 Thus, the plurality implied that aesthetics, at least when
combined with traffic safety, would be a valid basis for the exercise
of police power.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan recognized the validity of
aesthetic considerations. Nevertheless, he regarded the city's failure
to prove a substantial interest in aesthetics as fatal to the ordinance
in the case under review, due to the presence of first amendment
infringements.43
Three of the Justices wrote dissenting opinions, but were in favor
of the exercise of police power to promote aesthetic concerns. Chief
Justice Burger remarked that the Court should defer to decisions of
the legislature to base regulations on aesthetic concerns, absent the
involvement of any regulation of speech.44 Justice Rehnquist, in a
bold dissent, forthrightly stated that the aesthetic considerations in-
volved in the case could by themselves support the validity of the or-
dinance.45 Likewise, Justice Stevens recognized the validity of the
city's aesthetic concerns. 46
In sum, the Justices appear to support those states which consider
aesthetic concerns to be an ample basis for state exercise of police
power. Thus, decisions of California courts which uphold the imposi-
tion of aesthetic conditions upon new development would appear to
be in accord with the beliefs of a majority of the Justices now on the
Supreme Court. If the Court were squarely faced with the issue, it
seems predictable that it would find aesthetic concerns to be a valid
basis for state action.
42. Id at 512 (plurality opinion). The city's anti-billboard ordinance was neverthe-
less struck down by a finding that the state concern was outweighed by a significant
first amendment violation. Id. at 521 (plurality opinion).
43. "I do not doubt that '[i]t is within the power of the [city] to determine that the
community should be beautiful,' but that power may not be exercised in contravention
of the First Amendment." Id. at 530 (citation omitted) (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 33 (1954)) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
44. Id. at 561 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
45. Also citing Berman v. Parker, Justice Rehnquist stated, "In my view, the aes-
thetic justification alone is sufficient to sustain a total prohibition of billboards within
a community .... Id. at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
46. "I believe a community has the right to decide that its interests in... securing
beautiful surroundings outweigh the countervailing interests in uninhibited expression
by means of words and pictures in public places." Id. at 550 (Stevens, J., dissenting in
part).
B. Validity of Coastal Commission Exactions from Landowners
Where Subdivision of Property is not Involved
1. Comparison: Cases Involving the Subdivision of Land
Coastal Commission exactions of land for public beach access, in
which the landowner receives no compensation, typically arise in
cases in which the beach-homeowner is not subdividing, but only
seeking to improve or repair his property. However, there are signifi-
cant policy distinctions between that fact pattern and the cases in
which a builder seeks to subdivide land for development. Exactions
of private property from developers wishing to subdivide have tradi-
tionally been recognized as validly falling within the state's police
power.4 7
The justifications commonly offered in support of state authoriza-
tion to attach such conditions to new development permits are as
follows:
(1) Subdivision results in an increased demand for public
services, which are more fairly paid by the subdivider than
by the government, since he is able to pass the cost of the
exaction to the new inhabitants of the subdivision;48
(2) Subdivision is viewed as a privilege extended by the
state;49 and
(3) The subdivider obtains an overall economic benefit
through the privilege of a development permit.50
It is, therefore, considered to be a reasonable exercise of police power
for a developer to be required to dedicate a parcel of a subdivision to
the state which will in turn be used in providing benefits to the
public.
Where the subdivision of land is involved, the attachment of public
access conditions to the granting of permission to undertake new de-
47. "With rare exceptions, subdivision statutes authorize ... dedication of land for
[public welfare purposes] as a condition for subdivision approval." D. HAGMAN, supra
note 22, at 138. See also CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66477 (West Supp. 1987) (stating that "the
legislative body of a city or county may, by ordinance, require the dedication of land
... for park or recreational purposes as a condition to the approval of a [land develop-
ment project] .... ). However, this law also imposes a reasonableness standard on
land dedications required for approval. See id. § 66477(e).
48. Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442, (1965),
appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966). The court recognized that "the municipality may
require [the subdividing party] to dedicate part of his platted land to meet a demand to
which the municipality would not have been put but for the influx of people into the
community to occupy the subdivision lots." Id. at 620, 137 N.W.2d at 448.
49. See generally 7 P. ROHAN, supra note 2, § 45.04(1), at 45-92.
50. "The municipality by approval of a proposed subdivision plat enables the sub-
divider to profit financially by selling the subdivision lots as home-building sites and
thus realizing a greater price than could have been obtained if he had sold his property
as unplatted lands." Jordan, 28 Wis. 2d at 620, 137 N.W.2d at 448.
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velopment within the coastal zone constitutes a permissible exercise
of police power of the State of California; the power of eminent do-
main need not be invoked.5 1 A public purpose is clear and evident,
since public access to the tidelands is an important concern of the
state.5 2 Moreover, the applicability of the above-mentioned justifica-
tions in cases involving the subdivision of land provides a plausible
rationale for the proposition that the regulation is reasonable and not
arbitrary.
The California courts have tended to ignore the distinctions be-
tween a subdivider developing a tract of land and a landowner seek-
ing to improve a single parcel. Where the subdivision of land is not
involved, the Coastal Commission has been improperly permitted to
attach public access conditions to permits to construct new develop-
ments in the coastal zone.
2. Cases Not Involving Subdivision of Land
While Professor Nichols5 3 and courts in other states54 have recog-
nized the difference between requiring exactions from subdividers as
opposed to single parcel landowners, California courts continue to ap-
ply the exaction principle to cases not involving the subdivision of
51. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
52. "The public need for access to state beaches on foot or visually and the impor-
tance the people of California place on that need have been embodied in the California
Coastal Zone Conservation Act." Sea Ranch Ass'n v. California Coastal Comm'n, 527
F. Supp. 390, 395 (N.D. Cal.), vacated, 454 U.S. 1070 (1981).
53. "[T]he developers of new subdivisions may be required by a municipality to
provide facilities such as roads, streets, sewers, and playgrounds as a condition to ap-
proval of a plat." 1 NICHOLS, supra note 21, § 1.42[2], at 1-169. "The foregoing would
not, however, apply to the building of a single structure which is not part of a subdivi-
sion." Id. at 1-190.
54. See, e.g., Board of Supervisors of James City County v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 216
S.E.2d 199 (1975). The court acknowledged that it dealt not "with the creation of a
subdivision but with development of individually-owned parcels of land," and consid-
ered the issue to be "whether [the government] has the power to... require[ ] individ-
ual landowners, as a condition to the right to develop their parcels, to dedicate [land]
for the purpose of providing a public road... [] the need for which... (was] substan-
tially generated by public traffic demands rather than by the proposed development."
Id. at 138, 216 S.E.2d at 208. See also Battaglia v. Wayne Township Planning Bd., 98
N.J. Super. 194, 236 A.2d 608 (1967), which states:
The purposes and justification for imposing conditions upon the subdivider are
-not present in the case of a landowner who.., applies for a permit to build a
single building. Unlike the case of a land subdivision, no new streets are ne-
cessitated by plaintiff's planned use; there are no purchasers [of the subdi-
vided lots] to whom the cost of improvements can be passed, and plaintiff's
land receives no discernable benefit from compliance with the imposed
conditions.
Id. at 199-200, 236 A.2d at 611-12 (emphasis added).
property. For example, the court in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission5 5 dealt with the validity of the Commission's imposition
of a public access dedication condition upon a private landowner
seeking to rebuild his single-family home on an undivided single lot.
The court of appeals upheld the condition, completely disregarding
the fact that the rationale which supports public purpose exactions
had no bearing on the facts of the case.
The exaction attached to the landowners' request to build in Nol-
lan was improper. The planned construction would not have resulted
in an increase in local population, the privilege of subdivision was not
involved, and any profits likely to have resulted would have been
small by comparison to those reaped where the subdivision of land
into multiple parcels for public sale is involved.
In Whaler's Village Club v. California Coastal Commission,5 6 a
California court in like manner applied the subdivision exaction prin-
ciple despite its inapplicability to the facts of the case. Although the
apartment complex in the case may have required a subdivision of
property at some time in the past, the development for which the
owners sought a permit involved neither the "privilege" of subdivi-
sion, nor did it increase the local population. Furthermore, in no way
could it be said that improvement to the apartment complex provided
the kind of economic benefits enjoyed by a developer who subdivides
his property and then sells it to the public. Instead, the landowners
in Whaler's Village were simply trying to retain the value of their
property by constructing a rock revetment to shield it from destruc-
tion by the surf.57
The Whaler's Village court went so far as to state that, "as a gen-
eral proposition, the Commission may constitutionally require un-
compensated access dedication as a condition of approving coastal
development."58 This remark illustrates the court's failure to distin-
guish the subdivision cases, in which the subdivider reaps an overall
economic benefit, from the beach easement exactions of the Coastal
Commission, in which the single-parcel landowner may only be seek-
ing to protect or maintain the value of his property.
The presence of a valid state interest is only the first prong of the
test for the validity of the exercise of police power. The second
prong-that of reasonableness-is unfulfilled in cases where ease-
ments are exacted from individuals not subdividing their property.
Thus, the State of California acts in excess of its police power when it
55. 177 Cal. App. 3d 719, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28, prob. juris. noted, 107 S. Ct. 312, dismis-
sal denied, 107 S. Ct. 665 (1986).
56. 173 Cal. App. 3d 240, 220 Cal. Rptr. 2 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1962 (1986)
(the appeal was denied for want of jurisdiction).
57. See id.
58. Id. at 256, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 11 (emphasis added).
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exacts public access easements from nonsubdividing landowners
without compensating them. California should instead be required to
use its power of eminent domain 59 in making any such exactions, and
pay the aggrieved landowners just compensation.60
C Validity of Exactions Where No Direct Relationship Exists
Between the Exaction and the Intended Development
In the recent case of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,61
the California Court of Appeal applied an "indirect nexus" test to de-
termine the validity of beach access exactions by the Commission.
The court held that only an indirect relationship between the exac-
tion imposed and the public need to which the new development pro-
ject contributed is required in order for an exaction condition to
validly fall within the state's police power.62
The seminal case for what is termed the "indirect nexus" or "indi-
rect relationship" test is Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of
Walnut Creek,6 3 decided in 1971. Since then, the rule has been re-
peatedly applied in Commission exaction cases to validate exactions
from landowners. Such exactions have been upheld even where the
specific proposed development could in no way be said to be responsi-
ble for creating or increasing the need for public access to the tide-
lands.64 The reasoning for allowing such exactions is that, although
the individual development does not create the need for public ac-
cess, an exaction is permissible "if its effect together with the cumu-
lative impact of similar projects would in the future create or
increase the need for a system of such compensating accessways." 65
California courts have justified these exactions by noting that state
police power actions have traditionally been tested for validity under
59. "Exercise of the power of eminent domain is proper only for a public use and
only when use of the extraordinary power of eminent domain is necessary." D.
HAGMAN, supra note 22, § 174.
60. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
61. 177 Cal. App. 3d 719, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28, prob. juris. noted, 107 S. Ct. 312, dismis-
sal denied, 107 S. Ct. 665 (1986).
62. Id. at 723, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 30.
63. 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971). See also Ayres v. City of
Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949). The Associated Home Builders court be-
gan its analysis with a discussion of Ayres. Associated Home Builders, 4 Cal. 3d at 638,
484 P.2d at 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
64. See, e.g., Nollan, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 723, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 30.
65. Remmenga v. California Coastal Comm'n, 163 Cal. App. 3d 623, 628, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 628, 631, appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 241, reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 584 (1985).
the fourteenth amendment due process clause66 by applying a "ra-
tional basis" test.67 Under this test, if the "legislation [has] a rational
relationship to a legitimate end of government," 68 the legislation will
be upheld. Rationality is presumed, since "courts do not substitute
their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bod-
ies, who are elected to pass laws," and, accordingly, the exactions by
the Commission should be left alone.69
The indirect nexus rule has been followed by a small number of
states besides California. 70 However, most jurisdictions passing on
the issue of the validity of governmentally imposed exactions for the
public benefit have shunned the liberal Associated Home Builders
rule of California. Instead, the decisions demonstrate a preference
for a test which requires the showing of a direct nexus between the
exaction imposed and the particular public needs generated by the
landowner's proposed development.71
California's indirect nexus rule has been criticized as "allow[ing]
local governments almost unlimited discretion in the imposition of
dedication requirements." 72 The rule is especially unjust when ap-
plied to an individual landowner developing a single lot.73 A Florida
66. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
67. See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926) (applying "ra-
tional basis" test to governmental regulation of real property).
68. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 443 (2d ed. 1983)
[hereinafter J. NOWAK].
69. Remmenga, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 629, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 632 (citing Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963)).
70. See, e.g., Collis v. City of Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 246 N.W.2d 19 (1976);
Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Kansas City, 555 S.W.2d 832 (Mo. 1977); Call v. City of
W. Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d
608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1966).
71. See, e.g., Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n, 160 Conn. 109,
273 A.2d 880 (1970); Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d
375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961); Schwing v. City of Baton Rouge, 249 So. 2d 304 (La. 1971);
Howard County v. JJM, Inc., 301 Md. 256, 482 A.2d 908 (1984); Billings Properties, Inc.
v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964); Simpson v. City of North
Platte, 206 Neb. 240, 292 N.W.2d 297 (1980); Land/Vest Properties, Inc., v. Town of
Plainfield, 117 N.H. 817, 379 A.2d 200 (1977); Longridge Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd.
of Princeton Township, 52 N.J. 348, 245 A.2d 336 (1968); McKain v. Toledo City Plan-
ning Comm'n, 26 Ohio App. 2d 171, 270 N.E.2d 370 (1971); Gary D. Reihart, Inc. v.
Township of Carroll, 487 Pa. 461, 409 A.2d 1167 (1979); Frank Asuni, Inc. v. City of
Cranston, 407 R.I. 63, 264 A.2d 910 (1970); City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp.,
680 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1984). Cf. Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 338 So. 2d
863 (Fla. App. 1976) (termed its rule the "rational nexus" test; rejected rule requiring
proof by the government that the exaction is "specifically and uniquely attributable"
to the needs created by the new development, and avoided the California approach as
too liberal). See also MODEL LAND DEV. CODE § 2-103 (1976); 2 P. ROHAN, supra note 2,
§ 9.01[2].
72. Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 338 So. 2d 863, 866 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1976).
73. See supra notes 47-60 and accompanying text.
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district court of appeal, in abandoning the California indirect nexus
rule, remarked as follows:
[W]hile such wide latitude is routinely accorded in other areas of police power
regulation, required dedication as a condition for approval for subdivision
plats stands in derogation of constitutionally protected property rights. Thus,
it is imperative that some sort of standard be imposed which will not allow
virtually unbridled interference with private property.7 4
Thus, most other states have recognized the potential dangers of al-
lowing such wide discretion to state lawmakers. Numerous Califor-
nia coastal residents would undoubtedly argue that these concerns
have come to fruition in their home state. Nevertheless, the Califor-
nia rule is supported by the long standing test of police power valid-
ity: namely, that so long as "the validity of the legislative
classification... be fairly debatable[,] the legislative judgment must
be allowed to control.' '75 This rational basis test is almost always
passed by the legislation in question.76
Notwithstanding this, California's rule requiring no direct nexus
between the conditions imposed and any burdens created by the new
development may be considered patently arbitrary where subdivision
is not involved. Commission exactions from individual beach prop-
erty owners should therefore be found unconstitutional.7 7 Neverthe-
less, even if the general validity of an exercise of state police power is
upheld, a resultant interference with private property rights is still
subject to separate analysis under the taking clause of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.78
IV. VALIDITY OF COASTAL COMMISSION PUBLIC ACCESS EXACTIONS
UNDER THE TAKING CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution has become
the basis of numerous challenges to the Coastal Commission's au-
thority to require public access dedications as a condition to granting
74. Wald, 338 So. 2d at 866.
75. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
76. J. NOWAK, supra note 68, at 449-50.
77. Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Penn Central acknowledges that "when particu-
lar individuals are singled out to bear the cost of advancing the public convenience,
that imposition must bear some reasonable relation to the evils to be eradicated or the
advantages to be secured ...." Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 148 n.11 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Nashville, Chatanooga & St.
Louis Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 429-30 (1935)).
78. See infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
new development permits. 79 The fifth amendment states in perti-
nent part that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation." 0
While a land use regulation may be valid under the police power of
a state, it may still constitute a taking of private property for public
use for which the fifth amendment requires that just compensation
be paid. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,81 the
United States Supreme Court indicated that a two-step analysis must
be applied to determine whether a particular regulation is constitu-
tional. The Court stated:
The Court of Appeals determined that § 828 serves... legitimate public pur-
pose[s] ... and thus is within the State's police power. We have no reason to
question that determination. It is a separate question, however, whether an
otherwise valid regulation so frustrates property rights that compensation
must be paid. 8 2
Thus, state interference with land use will be found improper if
the action can either be characterized as one which, due to arbitrari-
ness or lack of public purpose, exceeds the scope of the police power.
State interference is also improper if the regulation effects a taking
of the private property without paying just compensation. 83 The
United States Supreme Court introduced a comprehensive test for
determining when a government act affecting private property may
be deemed a taking in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York.8 4 Although the Court acknowledged that its approach was es-
sentially "ad hoc" in nature,8 5 it identified several factors to be used
in determining how to classify the government's action.
Among the factors offered by the Court were: (1) "[t]he economic
impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent
to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-
backed expectations . . .,";86 (2) "the character of the governmental
action";8 7 and (3) whether the "government action [ ] . . . may be
79. See, e.g., Sea Ranch Ass'n v. California Coastal Comm'n, 527 F. Supp. 390 (N.D.
Cal. 1981); Whaler's Village Club v. California Coastal Comm'n, 173 Cal. App. 3d 240,
254, 220 Cal. Rptr. 2, 9 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1962 (1986).
80. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment has been incorporated to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City
of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
81. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
82. Id. at 425 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
83. Just compensation is normally based upon the fair market value of the prop-
erty taken. J. NOWAK, supra note 68, at 494.
84. 438 U.S. 104 (1977).
85. Id. at 124.
86. Id.
87. Id. The Court, distinguishing between actual "physical invasion[s] by govern-
ment," and interferences "aris[ing] from some public program adjusting the benefits
and burdens of economic life to promote the common good," remarked that a taking
would more likely be found in the prior case. Id.
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characterized as [an] acquisition[ ] of resources to permit or facilitate
[a] uniquely public function[ ] 8.... 88
A. Factor One: Interference with Investment-Backed Expectations
Beach-front property owners in California unquestionably pay
some of the highest prices in the nation for their land.89 Public access
dedication requirements imposed by the Coastal Commission often
cause a significant devaluation of these properties. 90 Thus, it may
genuinely be said that such exactions constitute a significant interfer-
ence with the "distinct investment-backed expectations" of these
individuals.91
While one factor to be considered is the fact that the Commission
exactions interfere with economic expectations, state interference
alone does not normally provide sufficient grounds for finding a com-
pensable taking. State regulations of land use which result in dimi-
nution of private property values have traditionally been upheld by
the courts, so long as the landowner retains some beneficial use of
the property.92
88. Id. at 128.
89. For example, vacant beach-front lots in Malibu, California range in value from
$175,000 to over $5,000,000. The value per frontage foot ranges from $6,000 to $25,000
per foot. Improved land in the same area is valued in the range of $350,000, on the low
end, up to $10,000,000 and more. Telephone interview with Jerry Pritchett, specialist
in appraisal of Malibu coastal properties (Pritchett Realty Corp., 21355 Pacific Coast
Hwy., Malibu, CA 90265, (213) 456-3692) (Jan. 30, 1987).
90. Mr. Jerry Pritchett of Pritchett Realty Corp. has devised a formula for esti-
mating the average devaluation to private beach-front property that results from the
imposition of a lateral public access easement across upland property by the Coastal
Commission. The mininum devaluation to unimproved land is calculated to be 10% of
the total value. Under this formula, a lot that has 40 frontage feet and a normal value
of $25,000 per frontage foot would be devalued by at least $100,000 as a result of the
Coastal Commission exaction. See id.
A more conservative estimate by another appraiser of the probable devaluation of
the same lot is $50,000, or 5%. Telephone interview with Donald Condit, real estate
appraiser (Condit Appraisal Co., 2714 Pico Blvd., Santa Monica, CA, (213) 450-5882)
(Jan. 23, 1987).
See also Grupe v. California Coastal Comm'n, 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 156, 212 Cal.
Rptr. 578, 582 (1985). In Gr-upe, the Commission exacted an area encompassing ap-
proximately 8,000 to 10,000 square feet, or approximately two-thirds of the total area of
the landowner's beach-front property. No dollar value diminution was mentioned in
the case.
91. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
92. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980) (stating that where a
land use regulation does not "prevent the best use of [the] land," it will be upheld de-
spite the imposition of limitations on the landowner's use thereof). See also Grupe, 166
Cal. App. 3d at 156, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 582 (upholding Commission's exaction of two-
thirds of landowner's property).
Contrary to the logic used by the California courts to uphold
Coastal Commission exactions, the United States Supreme Court, in
Kaiser Aetna v. United States,93 recognized that the expectancy of
the right to exclude others is a distinct investment-backed expecta-
tion. The Court held that government interference with this right
would warrant a finding of a compensable taking.94 It was observed
that a taking of private property resulted when the government de-
feated the landowner's expectation of an exclusionary interest in a
man-made marina. The marina was built so that it was connected to
navigable waterways of the United States. Prior to the development
the land had been a shallow pond that was private property under
state law. The Court reasoned that since the government had
granted prior consent to develop the pond into a marina, the devel-
oper's exclusionary expectation was reasonable and required the pay-
ment of just compensation if the government chose to exact the
property for public use.9s This holding was made in spite of the fact
that federal law does not generally permit the recognition of exclu-
sionary property rights in navigable waters.96
The importance the Court placed upon protecting a property
owner's general right to exclude others in Kaiser Aetna, in which the
disputed property was a navigable waterway, is highlighted by the
willingness of the Court to find an exception to the law of federal
navigational servitude. There is a general public right to interstate
93. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
94. Id. at 179. Although the Court did not expressly refer to the right to exclude
as an "investment-backed expectation," it may be readily inferred from the opinion
that such an analysis was employed by the Court in reaching its conclusion.
First of all, in the recitation of the facts in Kaiser Aetna, Justice Rehnquist stated
that the landowner "had invested millions of dollars in improving" the property. Id at
169. He later noted that the extent to which government regulation interferes with a
landowner's "reasonable investment-backed expectations" is one of the key factors
identified by previous decisions in making the taking inquiry. Id. at 175.
The Court next recognized that although not all economic interests are property
rights, there exist some " 'economc advantage[s]' that ha[ve] the law back of [them] to
such an extent that courts may 'compel others to... compensate for [their] invasion.'"
Id at 178.
It may therefore be concluded that where a landowner develops a reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectation in the right to exclude, that expectancy may not be defeated
by the government absent payment of just compensation.
95. Id. at 179. The Court recognized that
[w]hile the consent of individual officials representing the United States can-
not 'estop' the United States, it can lead to the fruition of a number of expec-
tancies embodied in the concept of 'property'-expectancies that, if
sufficiently important, the government must condemn and pay for before it
takes over the management of the landowner's property.
Id, (citations omitted).
96. See United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 69 (1913)
(no private property interest can exist in waters that are navigable in their natural
state). Note that the landowner in Kaiser Aetna had transformed a non-navigable
pond into a navigable waterway. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
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navigable waters which is recognized in order to keep open the high-
ways of commerce. 97 Notwithstanding this rule, the Kaiser Aetna
Court elevated the value of private property above the public interest
in navigable waters in that case.
California courts have attempted to distinguish Kaiser Aetna from
cases involving beach access exactions by the Coastal Commission.98
It has been argued that since Coastal Commission exaction cases in-
volve allegations of an exclusionary expectation with respect to pub-
lic trust lands, the property owners may not reasonably possess an
expectation of a right to exclude the public unless, as in Kaiser
Aetna, prior governmental approval had been obtained.99
Under the public trust doctrine, the state, as an attribute of its sov-
ereignty, is said to hold certain lands in fee simple for the public ben-
efit. Thus, the state has the power and the obligation to manage
these lands in a manner best suited to the public's needs.i0o In Cali-
fornia, tidelands are included within the public trust.' 0 ' Article 10,
section 4 of the California Constitution provides the basis for their in-
clusion: "No individual . . . claiming or possessing the frontage or
tidal lands of a... navigable water in this State[ ] shall be permitted
to exclude the right of way to such water whenever it is required for
any public purpose .... 1 o 2
However, there is no like basis to conclude that the uplandsio3
were intended to fall within the trust. Although section 4 of article
10 also mentions "frontages" as being included, the term does not re-
fer to the uplands. Records of the constitutional debates indicate that
"frontages" was used interchangeably with "tidelands" at the Califor-
nia Constitutional Convention, from which article 10, section 4
emerged.i04
97. Chandler-Dunbar, 229 U.S. at 69. the Kaiser Aetna court discussed the naviga-
tional servitude doctrine, but found the policy concerns of the rule to be outweighed
by certain private property concerns. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 175-78.
98. Whaler's Village Club v. California Coastal Comm'n, 173 Cal. App. 3d 240, 257,
220 Cal. Rptr. 2, 11 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1962 (1986).
99. See id at 257, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 12 (1985) (distinguished from Kaiser Aetna be-
cause "there was no prior governmental approval on which [the landowner] relied.").
100. See Comment, Public Access and the California Coastal Commission: A Ques-
tion of Overreaching, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 395, 404 (1981).
101. Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 796
(1971).
102. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 4 (emphasis added).
103. "Uplands" are those lands lying landward of the mean high tide line. See
supra note 13 and accompanying text.
104. The following brief quote from the debate at the convention is exemplary:
"Now, whether these rights exist for individuals or corporations makes no difference.
Several commentators have suggested that a latent right of public
access across private uplands is concomitant to access rights across
tidelands since, without the right to pass over the uplands, the public
access right to tidelands is effectively defeated at high tide.105 But
California courts have refused to extend the public trust to uplands
where interference with private property rights would result; thus,
there is no basis for concluding that the uplands fall within the
trust.10 6 And since privately owned uplands are not included within
the public trust, beach-front property owners may reasonably de-
velop an expectation of a right to exclude the public from privately
owned upland property even in the absence of prior governmental
consent.
It follows that Kaiser Aetna may not be distinguished on the basis
that the state has not given special consent to the exclusion of the
public from private beach-front property. Kaiser Aetna instead man-
dates that when the California Coastal Commission exacts public ac-
cess easements from these landowners, it interferes with their
"distinct investment-backed expectations"o7 of excluding the pub-
lic.1 0 s A taking, therefore, should be recognized.
B. Factor Two: The Character of the Governmental Action
The second Penn Central factor, when applied to Commission exac-
tion cases, further suggests the presence of a taking for which com-
pensation must be paid. The Court in Penn Central remarked that
"[a] 'taking' may more readily be found when the interference with
property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government,
These frontages are held in this state to the exclusion of lawful traffic across these tide
lands to the salt water." Comment, supra note 100, at 408 n.56 (quoting DEBATES AND
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 1438
(1880) (emphasis added)).
105. See Eikel & Williams, The Public Trust Doctrine and the California Coastline,
6 URB. LAw. 519, 565 (1974); Comment, California Beach Access: The Mexican Law and
the Public Trust, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 571, 572 (1972); Comment, Public Beach Access Exac-
tions: Extending the Public Trust Doctrine to Vindicate Public Rights, 28 UCLA L.
REV. 1049, 1072-73 (1981).
106. The fact that uplands are not subject to the public trust doctrine is widely rec-
ognized. No cases were found in which the issue is litigated, but the decisions that dis-
tinguish uplands and tidelands do not dispute that the landowner can exercise his
normal property rights in the uplands.
For example, in a 1930 decision the supreme court said, "It is recognized that the
owner of land riparian to a navigable body of water has no right below the high-tide
line as against the state .... " City of Oakland v. E. K. Wood Lumber Co., 211 Cal. 16,
22, 292 P. 1076, 1079 (1930). By reverse implication, therefore, it is clear that the land-
owner's property rights do not stop until the mean high tide line is reached. See also
City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties, 31 Cal. 3d 288, 642 P.2d 792, 182
Cal. Rptr. 599 (1982); County of Orange v. Heim, 30 Cal. App. 3d 694, 106 Cal. Rptr. 825
(1973).
107. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
108. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178-80 (1979).
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than when interference arises from some public program adjusting
the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common
good."1 0 9
State zoning ordinances provide the classic example of the type of
governmental regulation which does not result in a finding of a tak-
ing.i"o California courts have upheld the Commission's authority to
require public access exactions without paying just compensation by
analogizing this activity to valid exercises of state zoning power.''
However, Commission access exactions can be distinguished from or-
dinary zoning ordinances, since the exactions entail the additional el-
ement of a physical invasion of private property by the public.i"2
The element of physical invasion has been regarded as particularly
noxious in a recent United States Supreme Court decision. In Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,li3 the Court introduced a
"bright line" test for determining when a taking will be recognized.
Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, concluded "that a permanent
physical occupation authorized by government is a taking without re-
gard to the public interest that it may serve."'1 4 The Court's decision
was apparently influenced by its recognition that a property owner
"suffers a special kind of injury when a stranger directly invades and
occupies [his] property."" i 5
Coastal Commission beach access exactions involve dedications of
limited duration, usually twenty-one years." 6 It is arguable that they
should be excluded from the scope of the Loretto holding, which indi-
cates that a permanent occupation is required. However, a physical
occupation of a duration that is less than ad infinitum will satisfy
the Court's permanency requirement."i 7
109. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (citation omitted).
110. Id. at 125.
111. See Whaler's Village Club v. California Coastal Comm'n, 173 Cal. App. 3d 240,
220 Cal. Rptr. 2 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1962 (1986). "In an analogous setting [to
the coastal access exaction fact situation involved in the case], the United States
Supreme Court, as well as the California Supreme Court have held that a zoning ordi-
nance may be 'unconstitutional and subject to invalidation . Id. at 258, 220 Cal.
Rptr. at 12 (emphasis added).
112. The language of the dedications exacted generally includes extending to the
public a right of "access" and to engage in "passive recreational use" of the upland area
immediately fronting the landowner's residence. Id. at 249, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
113. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
114. Id. at 426.
115. Id at 436 (emphasis in original).
116. See, e.g., Whaler's Village, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 263-64, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
117. Loretto involved the installation of a cable TV wire and other hardware across
a private landowner's rooftop. The Court maintained that since the installation was to
The Loretto majority seemed primarily concerned with distinguish-
ing long-term invasions from those of very short duration, which "do
not absolutely dispossess the owner of his rights to use, and exclude
others from, his property.""i8 The Court cited PruneYard Shopping
Center v. Robins19 to exemplify the distinction.20 In PruneYard,
the Court found no taking occurred where the involved invasion
lasted only for "a Saturday afternoon."' 2'
By contrast, the twenty-one year duration of Coastal Commission
exactions results in a significant dispossession of property owners'
rights, thus falling squarely within the Loretto Court's broad inter-
pretation of the term "permanent." It follows that a taking should be
recognized in cases where the Coastal Commission exacts public ac-
cess dedications from private beach-front property owners since a
sufficiently "permanent physical occupation" authorized by the gov-
ernment is involved in those cases.
California courts, however, analyze the taking question based on
more than a mere showing that the government's interference
amounts to a permanent physical intrusion. Which party acted first
in "trigger[ing] the police power of the state" 22 is also considered.
Where the state's involvement was initiated by the state itself, a tak-
ing will be found;123 but where the state waits until the landowner
performs some triggering act, no taking is recognized in California. 24
This is a distinction without a difference. It is irrelevant whether
the state takes property outright or simply devises a scheme whereby
land is taken as a condition to the grant of permission to use land,
especially when the state knows that those uses will inevitably occur
(e.g. new construction or improvements to maintain the value of the
property). Whether the state characterizes its action as a taking or as
a mere condition, it involuntarily deprives property owners of their
land for public purposes. 25 The state's power to regulate the devel-
remain "[s]o long as the property remain[ed] residential and [so long as] a CATV com-
pany wishe[d] to retain the installation," the physical occupation satisfied the perma-
nency requirement. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 439.
118. Id. at 435 n.12.
119. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
120. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434.
121. 447 U.S. at 77.
122. Whaler's Village Club v. California Coastal Comm'n 173 (Cal. App. 3d 240, 257,
220 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1962 (1986).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Welch, 217 U.S. 333 (1910) (flooding of private land).
124. Zoning cases provide the paramount example. Zoning is considered a nonini-
tiatory government regulation which does not effect a taking so long as the restrictions
imposed are reasonably related to the promotion of the public health, safety, and gen-
eral welfare. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125-27 (1978).
125. One author posits the following standard for determining the constitutionality
of state attempts to impose such conditions:
[An assessment must be made of] the relative constitutional interests of the
individual and the interests of the state in asserting X [which is the particular
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opment of property should not be power to condition the landowner's
right to develop his land upon forfeiture of just compensation.1 26 The
application of this dubious distinction can and has yielded unjust
results.127
This distinction has been received with disapproval by the United
States Supreme Court.128 Furthermore, it certainly cannot govern in
light of dicta in the Loretto case, which states that "a permanent
physical occupation [by government] is a taking without regard to
other factors that a court might ordinarily examine."'129 Thus, appli-
cation of the landowner-initiated/state-initiated action rule is im-
proper. A finding of a permanent physical occupation by the state,
constitutional right-here it is the fifth amendment right to just compensation
for the taking of property] in the course of B [the non-constitutional right-
here it is the interest in the land development], as measured by the constitu-
tional standard that ordinarily governs the assertion and nonassertion of X in
other settings.
Westen, Incredible Dilemmas: Conditioning One Constitutional Right on the Forfei-
ture of Another, 66 IOWA L. REV. 741, 749 (1981) (emphasis added).
It follows from this that an otherwise compensable intrusion onto an individual's
property by a state cannot be made noncompensable by categorizing the deprivation as
a mere attachment of a condition.
126. See Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595 (1960). The ar-
gument for the imposition of such conditions is as follows:
It is contended that if the government may withhold the benefit in the first
instance, without giving a reason, it may withhold or revoke the benefit even
though its reason for doing so may be the individual's refusal to surrender his
constitutional rights....
... The potential erosion of fundamental liberties through the use of this
bargaining technique has prompted the development of the doctrine of "un-
constitutional conditions."
Id. at 1594-95. This doctrine generally declares that a state may not conditionally de-
prive an individual of a right which it was powerless to remove directly.
127. For example, in Whaler's Village landowners sought to construct a seawall to
protect their property from potential destruction by ocean waves. The landowners
were faced with the choice of either dedicating part of their property to the state for
public access, or risking the loss of their entire premises to the ocean surf. Whaler's
Village Club v. California Coastal Comm'n, 179 Cal. App. 3d 240, 220 Cal. Rptr. 2
(1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1962 (1986).
The trial court judge in the case properly recognized the arbitrariness of the distinc-
tion based upon which party acted first. He remarked that "the condition requiring
the homeowners to deed their entire private beach to the State or lose their homes to
the sea constituted an unlawful taking .. " Id. at 251, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 7. The deci-
sion of the trial court was reversed by the California Court of Appeal.
128. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). The
Court remarked that "a landlord's ability to rent his property may not be conditioned
on his forfeiting the right to compensation for a physical occupation.... The right of a
property owner to exclude a stranger's physical occupation of his land cannot be so
easily manipulated." Id. at 439 n.17.
129. Id. at 432 (emphasis added).
without consideration of who initiated the state action, should be dis-
positive in analyzing whether Commission exactions result in a tak-
ing of private property for which just compensation must be paid.
C. Factor Three: Whether the Acquisition is Intended to Facilitate
a Uniquely Public Function
The third factor announced by the Penn Central Court for deter-
mining whether a governmental act amounts to a taking of private
property for public use is whether the government "appropriated
part of [the] property for some strictly governmental purpose."1 30
Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority, proffered two factors for
determining whether this strictly governmental purpose, or uniquely
public function, is involved: first, whether the government's action
"exploits [the landowner's] parcel for city purposes"; and second,
whether it "facilitates [or] arises from ... entrepreneurial operations
of the city."131 While these factors may provide some guidelines for
identifying a uniquely public function, their application is uncertain
since the Court failed to explain their exact meaning.
For instance, any action taken by a state under the police power
can be argued to be necessarily for state purposes, at least in a broad
sense. After all, the purpose of government is to bestow benefits to
the public. The Court similarly provided no explanation of when a
governmental entity operates in an entrepreneurial capacity for pur-
poses of takings analysis.13 2
The Penn Central Court did, however, offer United States v.
Causby 133 as an example of a fact pattern involving a uniquely public
function. In Causby, the Court found that frequent overflights by
military aircraft above a landowner's chicken farm which destroyed
the commercial value of the property constituted a taking.134 Thus, it
can be inferred from Penn Central that, at least where the govern-
ment acts in furtherance of military goals, it satisfies the governmen-
tal purposes and entrepreneurial capacity criteria.135
130. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 135.
131. Id.
132. Webster's Dictionary defines "entrepreneur" as "one who organizes and di-
rects a business undertaking, assuming the risk for the sake of profit ...... WEBSTER'S
NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 608 (2d ed. 1983).
A governmental entity operates in an "entrepreneurial capacity" when it partici-
pates in an activity, such as that engaged in by the State of South Dakota in Reeves v.
Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (state involved in the sale of cement to the public). How-
ever, the Penn Central Court's reference to Causby as a case involving a government
entity acting in an enterprise capacity confuses this issue. See infra notes 133-35 and
accompanying text.
133. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
134. Id. at 259.
135. "Appellants ... would have us treat the [land-use regulation involved in the
case] as an instance, like that in United States v. Causby, in which government, acting
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The reference to Causby only confuses the test for finding the
existence of a uniquely public function in government action and,
hence, whether the action should be characterized as a taking. Mili-
tary activity intuitively does not readily comply with common notions
of entrepreneurial activity by government. It is uncertain whether
the entrepreneurial activity element should be considered on its face,
or whether an analogy to the situation in Causby is also necessary. If
the uniquely public function factor is considered only on its face,
then there is little guidance for distinguishing those cases in which a
regulation is in furtherance of a government entrepreneurial activity
and when it is an exercise of police power. Thus, the third Penn Cen-
tral factor is too obfuscated to be of any utility in prediciting future
Supreme Court cases.
V. CONCLUSION
Under the police power, the Commission acts properly when it con-
ditions approval of new development upon aesthetic factors. How-
ever, exactions from nonsubdividing landowners are arbitrary since
the rationales normally justifying such action are absent. While
Commission exactions of public access-easements in situations where
the particular development directly contributes to the need for public
access, as in a subdivision development, do not exceed police power,
the police power of the State of California is exceeded where exac-
tions are required of nonsubdividing landowners. In these situations,
the power of eminent domain, which requires compensation for the
land taken, is the proper vehicle for the state action.
The Loretto decision mandates that governmental interference
with land use should be subjected to a takings analysis under the
fifth amendment, despite a finding that a particular land regulation
may be valid under the police power. Application of all three factors
announced in Penn Central suggests that a compensable taking of
private property for public use should be recognized in cases involv-
ing public-access exactions by the California Coastal Commission.
First, the imposed conditions significantly thwart reasonable in-
vestment-backed expectations in the right to exclude the public,
which is a fundamental property right upheld in Kaiser Aetna. Sec-
ond, the exactions involve a significant permanent physical occupa-
tion by the public, which was found to be particularly noxious in
in an enterprise capacity, has appropriated part of their property for some strictly gov-
ernmental purpose." Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136.
Loretto. Each of these factors has alone been found sufficient to sup-
port a finding of a compensable taking.136 Although the proper appli-
cation of the third Penn Central factor is uncertain, satisfaction of
the first two factors should provide more than enough weight to war-
rant a finding that the Coastal Commission has exceeded the state's
police power in requiring easements across private beach-front
property.
For these reasons, the economic burden for the provision of public
access easements to the California tidelands should properly be borne
by the government through the collection of taxes from residents
throughout the state, rather than by violating the constitutional
rights of a few individuals. Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Penn Cen-
tral, quoting Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, is as fit-
ting now as ever:
Over 50 years ago, Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, warned that
the courts were 'in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve
the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter
cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.' 1 3 7
Public access to the state's tidelands is unquestionably of great im-
portance. If the California Coastal Commission determines the need
for access to justify the imposition of public access easements, the
state should be required to use the constitutional method of making
the change through eminent domain. The few beach-front owners
have a constitutional right to the payment of just compensation if
they are to have their land taken for the benefit of the many.
MITCHELL F. DISNEY
136. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (interference with the eco-
nomic advantage inuring to the owner by virtue of his right to exclude others was suf-
ficient to show a compensable taking); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 411 (1982) (permanent physical occupation dispositive).
137. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 152 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922)).
